Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Kathy Lynn Higgins, individually and as guardian
ad litem for Shaundra Higgins, her daughter, v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, by and through SALT
LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, DR.
WILLIAM KUENTZEL, SHERYL STEADMAN,
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH and THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL CENTER
: Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald E. Nehring; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Patricia J. Marlowe; attorney for appellees.
Rodney G. Snow, Neil A. Kaplan, James L. Warlaumont; Clyde, Pratt & Snow; attorneys for
appellant.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Higgins v. Salt Lake County, No. 90255.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2802

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DOCUMENT
KF'J
45.9

DOCKET NO.

BRIEF
j££^£f~

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KATHY LYNN HIGGINS, individually
and as guardian ad litem for
SHAUNDRA HIGGINS, her daughter,
Plaintiff-Appellant.

40o:
vs

Case No. -££255

SALT LAKE COUNTY, by and through
SALT LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH,
DR. WILLIAM KUENTZEL, SHERYL
STEADMAN, THE UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH and THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
MEDICAL CENTER,

Priority 16

Defendants-Appellees.
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF THE DECISION
ENTERED ON MAY 14, 1993
On Appeal from the Judgments of the Third District Court
In and For Salt Lake County
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge
Ronald E. Nehring #2374
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Valley Mental
Health, Inc.
Patricia J. Marlowe #2084
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Attorney for Salt Lake County
Defendants-Appellees

Rodney G. Snow #3028
Neil A. Kaplan #3974
James L. Warlaumont #3386
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
One Utah Center, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

FILED
HAY 2 8 1995
CLERK SUPREME COURT,
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KATHY LYNN HIGGINS, individually
and as guardian ad litem for
SHAUNDRA HIGGINS, her daughter,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
vs.

Case No. 90255

SALT LAKE COUNTY, by and through
SALT LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH,
DR. WILLIAM KUENTZEL, SHERYL
STEADMAN, THE UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH and THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
MEDICAL CENTER,

Priority 16

Defendants-Appellees.
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF THE DECISION
ENTERED ON MAY 14, 1993
On Appeal from the Judgments of the Third District Court
In and For Salt Lake County
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge
Ronald E. Nehring #2374
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Valley Mental
Health, Inc.
Patricia J. Marlowe #2084
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Attorney for Salt Lake County
Defendants-Appellees

Rodney G. Snow #3028
Neil A. Kaplan #3974
James L. Warlaumont #3386
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
One Utah Center, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
INTRODUCTION

1

POINT I - APPELLANT NEVER ADMITTED THAT SLCMH
WAS PERFORMING GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE ACT AND, IN FACT, HAS ALWAYS
ASSERTED TO THE CONTRARY

3

POINT II - APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IS SOUNDLY
BASED ON CONTROLLING PRECEDENT IN THIS JURISDICTION

5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page(s)

Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corp.,
797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990)

5

Higgins v. Salt Lake County, et al.,
No. 900255, Slip Op. at 12 (May 14, 1993)

2

Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services
667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983)

7

Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp.,

6

784 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989)
Shultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 115 (Utah 1988)

4, 5

Standiford v. Salt Lake City, Corp.,
605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah 1980)

4, 6

Other References
Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-1 -38 (1953 as amended)

5

Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-1

1

i

Rodney G. Snow (3028)
Neil A. Kaplan (3974)
James L. Warlaumont (3386)
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
One Utah Center, Suite 1000
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2208
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

JN THE SUPREME COURT

r .nE STATE OF UTAH

KATHX L¥NN HIGGINS, inaivia.
and as guardian ad litem foi
SHAUNDRA HIGGINS, h^r daughter
Plaintiff-Appellant.
(

SALT LAKE COUNTY, by and through
SALT LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH,
DR. WILLIAM KUENTZEL, SHERYL
STEADMAN, THE UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH and THE UNIVERSITY OF Ih'Aii
MEDICAL CENTER,

Prior

Defendants-Appellees.
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF THE DECISION
ENTERED ON MAY 14, 1993

INTRODUCTION

Procedure,

Appei.ii

Shr

~r"~t A

'*r

daughter
^txuj.uns» LUI a itjjiec*

^v.^..

-* e n t e r e d <"»«

Salt Lake County Mental Health I"SLCMH'
I I n II

it 11 r> r n i i i t M i l

iI

I iniiiiiii i I

Ma

"

"

' •

rt. i on of
iny I II.JI-

immune from s u i t under
U l l ,

et. seq. (the Act).
the governmental

In that portion of its decision dealing with

immunity defense raised by SLCMH, the Court

stated:
Both plaintiffs and defendants agree that UMC and SLCMH
were performing governmental functions within the meaning
of the Act. Therefore, they are immune from suit unless
the Act waives that immunity and does not provide an
applicable exception to that waiver.
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, et al., No. 900255, Slip Op. at 12
(May 14, 1993).
The Court's statement on this point which was key to its
immunity

ruling

was

erroneous.

Specifically,

the

Court

misapprehended or overlooked Appellant's consistent and repeated
argument that SLCMH was not performing a governmental function.
The Court's statement that Appellant agreed, i.e. admitted, SLCMH
was performing a governmental function was critical to the Court
affirming summary judgment on an issue that the Trial Court did not
reach.
A rehearing on this point is required.
admitted,

much

less

agreed,

that

SLCMH

Appellant never
was

performing

a

governmental function. In fact, Appellant expressly and repeatedly
asserted the SLCMH conduct at issue was non-governmental and relied
on the applicable opinions from this Court for her position.

For

the reasons now fully set forth below, we respectfully ask the
Court to grant a rehearing on this issue.
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was r e q u i r e d u

A 1 1 1 Il I 111II n r s P r t ed :

The University Medical Center, now dismissed, did not J J L|IJIi;11
the immunity defense and settled this case without a brief.
I n addi 11 on I: :::: as sert ing there was not a government a 1
function,, Appellant ::: 'J t: = •• ::i ::: c .ses from other jurisdictions disputing
that the conduct of SLCMH was "discretionary" and disputing the
applicability of the "assault and battery exception." Reply of
Appellant to SLCMH at 21. Appellant did not i ntend to exclude or
limit the position that a governmental fuiiction was not being
performed when these cases were cited.
3

The Act, in 1984 only required notice of governmental
functions. Shultz v. Conger# 755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988).
An essential governmental function is only one which
government can perform. Id. The courts have widely held
that treating, evaluating and hospitalizing the mentally
ill can be performed by a private health care provider
and universally dismiss the assertion of governmental
immunity to defeat a victim's claim.
Brief of Appellant to SLCMH at 20.
Further, in responding to the Amicus Curiae Brief of Valley
Mental Health, a private corporation now serving as the successor
to Salt Lake County Mental Health, Appellant indicated:
Valley's appearance as an amicus curiae is a way for Salt
Lake County Mental Health to argue its case twice.
Valley's appearance really serves as an example of the
misapplication of the government immunity principles by
Salt Lake County Mental Health. Salt Lake County Mental
Health has consistently argued that it is entitled to
"governmental immunity."
This argument denies that
"governmental immunity" applies where a function is
undertaken
"which only government
can perform."
Standiford v. Salt Lake City 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).
Since Appellant's claims arise out of activities which
can be performed by non-governmental entities like
Valley, and since the activities are "not exclusively
governmental", there can be no immunity. See Shultz v.
Conger, 755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988).
Reply of Appellant to Amicus Curiae Valley Mental Health, Inc.
at 4.

[emphasis added]

Appellant took the very same position in the Trial Court. In
opposition to summary judgment Appellant wrote:
It is also clear that immunity will not be a bar if the
conduct out of which the injury arises is not an
"essential governmental function." Clearly, the decision
to admit a patient is not something only the government
can perform.

4

Pit's, Menu in Opp. Summ. J. at 49.

In response to the argument

that an immunity notice was required, Appellant noted:
The Utah Governmental Immunity Statute and its notice
requirements come into play only where "essential"
governmental functions are involved. Shultz v. Conger,
755 P.2d 115 (Utah 1988). It is clear the conduct out of
which plaintiff's claim arises is not conduct which
constitutes an essential governmental function.
Pit's. Mem. in Opp. Summ. J. at 53.
The Trial Court never reached the governmental immunity issues
because it held there was no duty, a decision which this Court
reversed.

This Court did not inquire about immunity in oral

argument and focused only on the duty issue.
point

has

overlooked

or misapprehended

Its decision on this

Appellant's

position.

Accordingly, a petition for rehearing should be granted.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IS SOUNDLY BASED ON
CONTROLLING PRECEDENT IN THIS JURISDICTION
Appellant's

position

that

SLCMH

was

not

performing

a

governmental function in the treatment of Caroline Trujillo to
protect Shaundra Higgins was based on opinions from this Court.
The Legislature passed the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Annotated SS 63-30-1 -38 (1953 as amended), in 1965, but did not
define "governmental function" until 1987.
Thus, at the time this case arose in 1984, the only definition
for governmental function was found in Utah case law.

In the case

of Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corp., 797 P.2d 419, 420 (Utah

5

1990)/ the Court traced the history of "governmental functions" and
the precise situation of a claim that arose before 1987:
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§S 63-30-1 to -38 (Supp. 1985), establishes governmental
immunity "for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function," subject to various statutory
waivers.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3.
In 1987, the
legislature enacted its own definition of "governmental
function." See § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989). However, since
this case arose prior to that enactment, we consider the
definition of governmental function solely under case law
applicable before the 1987 amendment:
This Court has held that the test for
determining a governmental
function for
governmental immunity purposes "is whether the
activity under consideration is of such a
unique nature that it can only be performed by
a governmental agency or that it is essential
to the core of governmental activity."
Standi ford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230,
1236-37
(Utah 1980).
We later
elaborated that the Standiford test "does not
refer to what government may do, but to what
government alone must do" and includes
"activities not unique in themselves . . . but
essential
to the performance of those
activities that are uniquely governmental."
Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432,
434 (Utah 1981) (emphasis in original).
Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784
P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989).
The activities out of which plaintiff's claims arise when the
facts are construed in her favor involve Salt Lake County Mental
Health's failure to meet appropriate standards of care in treating
Caroline Trujillo to protect Shaundra.

The conduct at issue and

the duty to protect recognized by the Court do not involve the
exercise of a function that only government can perform or that is
essential to the core of government.
6

Rather, the duty recognized

by the Court involves conduct engaged in by all mental health
professionals that render services in the private as well as the
public sector.

Where a breach of the duty can be shown, the

government is held to the same standard as a private individual.
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51
(Utah 1983).
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should
grant this petition for rehearing.
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Kathy Lynn Higgins, individually
and as guardian ad litem for
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Plaintiff and Appellant,

No, 900255
FILED
May 14, 1993

v.
Salt Lake County, William
Kuentzel, Sheryl Steadman,
The University of Utahf The
University Medical Center,
Caroline Trujillo, and John
Does 1 through 10,
Defendants and Appellees.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon
Attorneys:

Rodney G. Snow, James L. Warlaumontf Neil A. Kaplan,
Stephen G. Stoker, Salt Lake City, and David B.
Thomas, Provo, for the Higginses
David E. Yocom, Patricia J. Marlowe, Salt Lake City,
for the County
Ronald E. Nehring, Salt Lake City, for Valley Mental
Health
Stephen J. Hill, Salt Lake City, for University of
Utah and University Medical Center

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
This case is before us on appeal from summary judgment
in favor of defendants Salt Lake County, Dr. William Kuentzel,
Sheryl Steadman, and the University of Utah. Plaintiff Kathy
Lynn Higgins, who is suing individually and as guardian ad litem
for her daughter Shaundra Higgins, argues that the trial court
erred in ruling that defendants owed no duty to protect either
her or her daughter from a potentially dangerous mental patient.
We conclude that the trial court erred in finding no duty but
affirm the lower court's summary judgment on the alternative
ground that governmental immunity bars Higgins's action.

Before we recite the facts, we note that in reviewing a
grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. E.g., Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468
(Utah 1992); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah
1991); Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power &
Light, 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). We state the facts in this
case accordingly. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d
212, 215 (Utah 1992).
On April 10, 1984, Carolyn Trujillo, a voluntary
patient at Salt Lake County Mental Health ("SLCMH"),x stabbed
then ten-year-old Shaundra. Trujillo had been diagnosed as a
paranoid schizophrenic with organic brain dysfunction and
marginal intelligence. Her mental illness manifested itself when
she was a teenager and was complicated by her abuse of illegal
drugs. Prior to the stabbing, she had been an involuntary
patient four times at the University of Utah Medical Center
("UMC") and twice at the Utah State Hospital. In late 1975,
following Trujillo/s release from her first hospitalization at
UMC, Sheryl Steadman, a registered nurse, was assigned as
Trujillo's primary therapist.
In July of 1981, Ogden police charged Trujillo with
assault and disorderly conduct after she struck a woman and a
child. Trujillo pleaded guilty in an Ogden court to disorderly
conduct. Before sentencing, however, she stabbed an elderly
woman in the buttocks in Salt Lake City and was charged with
aggravated assault. The Salt Lake court committed her to the
Utah State Hospital for a thirty-day evaluation to determine her
competency to stand trial. On December 1, 1981, she was found
incompetent to stand trial on the aggravated assault charge and
pleaded no contest to the reduced charge of simple assault
several days later. She was placed on probation for one year.
As a condition of probation, Trujillo was ordered to enter a
residential mental health program at Salt Lake County's Adult
Residential Treatment Unit ("ARTU11") in Salt Lake City.
In February of 1982, the Ogden court placed Trujillo on
one year's probation in connection with the disorderly conduct
charge. As a condition of probation, Trujillo was ordered to
take her medications and continue her treatment at ARTU. In
January of 1983, Trujillo,s probation officer recommended that
both the Ogden and Salt Lake City probation orders be terminated
because Trujillo had complied with the conditions of both. Her

1

Salt Lake County Mental Health consists of three mental
health systems: Salt Lake, Granite, and Copper Mountain. Each
system was established by Salt Lake County; the three were
consolidated in approximately 1982 to form Salt Lake County
Mental Health.
Mo,
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probations in Ogden and Salt Lake City were subsequently
terminated•
In February of 1984, Trujillo superficially cut her
wrists. Two days later, she and her mother went to the UMC
emergency room and requested that Trujillo be hospitalized. The
request was denied, allegedly due to a shortage of beds, but Katy
Jones, a crisis specialist on the UMC staff, referred Trujillo to
ARTU for a crisis stay. When Trujillo arrived at ARTU on that
Saturday, Larry Romero, a crisis line operator who was not
authorized to diagnose patients, created a treatment plan for
Trujillo that called for a short stay to assess her living
environment. Dr. Joy Ely, a part-time psychiatrist at ARTU, saw
Trujillo the following Monday. Trujillo was discharged from ARTU
on March 14, 1984, and was placed in an evening/weekend program,
a move calculated to ease her transition from the institution to
society. She attended several, but not all, sessions through the
end of the month and last saw Steadman on March 21, 1984. At
this meeting, Steadman found Trujillo to be stable.
On April 10, 1984, Trujillo was alone at her home when
she heard voices telling her "to stab someone." She left the
house and began walking toward a nearby alley. When she spotted
Shaundra, a child she knew from the neighborhood, she followed
the girl into the alley next to her house. Trujillo called to
Shaundra and then stabbed the girl three times, severing her
aorta and puncturing her abdomen. Despite her injuries, Shaundra
survived the attack.
Higgins claims that Trujillo had been brooding over and
planning to hurt Shaundra for six months before the attack.
However, in an interview with police detectives after the
stabbing, Trujillo said that she had no particular victim in mind
when she armed herself with a knife and left her room. She told
the detectives that she intended to stab "[j]ust anybody." In a
subsequent interview, Trujillo told a psychiatrist that even
though she was not looking for Shaundra at the time of the
stabbing, she believed that Shaundra had struck her six-year-old
daughter. She also said that she hated Higgins because Higgins
refused to give her cigarettes and was "a slut."
Trujillo was found "guilty and mentally ill" of the
charge of attempted criminal homicide, a second degree felony,
and was committed to the Utah State Hospital.2 Shortly
thereafter, Higgins sued Salt Lake County and the University of
Utah, claiming that they owed her and her daughter a duty to
2

After spending approximately nine months in the Utah State
Hospital, Trujillo appeared in court again and pleaded guilty to
attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony. She was then
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five
years.
3
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control and/or to treat Trujillo correctly and that if defendants
had performed their professional duties properly, the stabbing
would not have occurred. Higgins sought damages for her own
emotional distress and for physical and emotional injuries to her
daughter.
Higgins asserted the following specific allegations of
negligence as a basis for her suit. First, she contended that
the University of Utah was negligent in its treatment of Trujillo
in that U M C s crisis specialist, nurse Jones, was negligent in
her diagnosis, treatment, and failure to have Trujillo
involuntarily committed or voluntarily admitted to the hospital
after her suicide attempt. Particularly, Higgins asserted that
Jones (i) never reviewed Trujillo's medical records, (ii) did not
involve qualified personnel in evaluating Trujillo, and
(iii) never evaluated Trujillo's threat to others in the
community.
Second, Higgins contended that Salt Lake County was
negligent in its diagnosis, supervision, treatment of, and
failure to commit Trujillo. Specifically, she alleged that
(i) therapist Steadman prescribed improper medication for
Trujillo, (ii) crisis worker Romero was unqualified to diagnose
or create a treatment plan, and (iii) Dr. Ely was unqualified to
handle Trujillo,s case and failed to review Trujillo's medical
records or consult with qualified personnel. The trial court
granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that they
owed no duty of care to either Higgins or her daughter. Higgins
appeals.
We first state the applicable standard of review.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Sandv citv, 827 P.2d
at 214; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159; Landes v. Capital Citv Bank,
795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). Because entitlement to summary
judgment is a question of law, no deference is due the trial
court's determination of the issues presented. However, we may
affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the
trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. See Hill v.
Seattle First Nat'l Bank. 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992).
With this standard in mind, we turn to the issues on
appeal, which are as follows: First, assuming that defendants
may have failed to use reasonable care in treating, supervising,
diagnosing, and not committing Trujillo, did defendants owe a
duty to the Higginses, and if so, did such acts and omissions
breach that duty? Second, even if there was such a breach of
duty, does the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10, bar Higgins's claims? We discuss these issues in

Mo.
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turn.
As the trial court recognized below, the proper sequence
of analysis is to determine, first, whether defendants had a duty
to the Higginses and, if so, whether they breached that duty, and
second, whether governmental immunity shields defendants from
suit. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1162 n.3.
We begin with the question of defendants' duty to the
Higginses. Duty is an essential element of negligence. E.g.,
Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1159; Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151
(Utah 1989); Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah
1986). Unless defendants owed a duty to.the Higginses, there is
no cause of action. Higgins advances several theories upon which
to base a finding of duty. These theories have two basic
conceptual themes: first, that defendants owed a general duty to
any third party foreseeably at risk from their negligence in
treating and supervising Trujillo, and second, that a special
relationship existed between defendants and Trujillo that gave
rise to a duty by defendants to the Higginses.
We reject the first of these grounds as being contrary
to established precedents in this and other states. As we
recently explained, "Because people are inherently less
controllable than physical things, the common law has imposed no
duty to control the conduct of others except in certain
circumstances, as where a special relationship exists."4 Traoo
v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 835 P.2d 161, 161 (Utah 1992). The
soundness of this limitation on liability as it operates in the
context of a patient/therapist relationship is plain. First,
given the empirically demonstrated inability of trained healthcare professionals to reliably predict future dangerousness, the
legal limitations on the involuntary confinement of mental
patients, and the need for a confidential relationship between
care providers and patients for therapy to succeed, the general
duty that plaintiffs would have us impose would be both
3

Higgins also claims negligent infliction of emotional
distress. However, we find no reason to address this claim
because it is disposed of by Hansen v. Sea Rav Boats. Inc.. 830
P.2d 236 (Utah 1992).
4

For similar reasons, we reject Higgins's related argument
that we should extend the duty imposed on doctors for negligent
treatment of infectious or contagious diseases to the
psychotherapist's negligent treatment of a dangerous patient.
This attempted analogy fails for the following reasons: First,
infectious diseases are generally more identifiable than
dangerous mental illness; second, there is more certainty of harm
with an infectious disease than from a patient who may be labeled
"dangerous"; and third, the means of preventing harm from an
infectious disease are usually less restrictive of personal
freedom than the means used to prevent harm from those with
mental illness.
5
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realistically incapable of performance and inconsistent with the
basic relationship between therapist and patient. See Jerome S.
Beigler, Tarasoff v. Confidentiality, 2 Behav. Sciences & L. 273,
277-79 (1984) [hereinafter Beigler]; John G. Fleming & Bruce
Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma. 62
Cal. L. Rev. 1025, 1044-45 (1974) [hereinafter Fleming &
Maximov]; Mark J. Mills, The So-Called Duty to Warn: The
Psychotherapeutic Duty to Protect Third Parties from Patients'
Violent Acts, 2 Behav. Sciences & L. 237, 241 (1984) [hereinafter
Mills]; David L. Faigman, To Have and To Have Not: Assessing the
Value of Social Science to the Laws as Science and Policy, 38
Emory L. Rev. 1005, 1076 (1989).
Second, in part because the proposed duty is
incompatible with the real world environment in which patients
and health-care professionals coexist, this ill-defined,
amorphous duty would invite jury hindsight bias. See Robert F.
Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due
Care; Psychotherapists and Crystallized Standards of Tort
Liability, J. Psychiatry & L. 163, 165 (Summer 1989) [hereinafter
Schopp & Wexler]. The resulting duty to the general public would
"closely approximate a strict liability standard of care, and
therapists would be potentially liable for all harm inflicted by
persons presently or formerly under psychiatric treatment."
Cooke v. Berlin. 735 P.2d 830, 836 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting
Bradv v. Hopper. 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd,
751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984)); accord Abernathv v. United
States, 773 F.2d 184, 190 (8th Cir. 1985).
Finally, we note that these defendants are public
entities or employees who are charged with protecting the wellbeing of the general public. See Qbray v. Malmberg, 484 P.2d
160, 162 (Utah 1971). However, ,f[f]or a governmental agency and
its agents to be liable for negligently caused injury suffered by
a member of the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a
duty owed him for herl as an individual, not merely the breach of
an obligation owed to the general public at large bv the
governmental official." Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 (emphasis
added); accord Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.2 (Utah
1989).
Higgins presents us with no persuasive reasons for
departing from our precedents and sacrificing these important
policy considerations. We refuse to adopt the general negligence
scheme they propose.
The second ground for the Higginses' claim of duty, the
special relationship theory, requires more extended analysis.
Higgins argues that defendants had a "special relationship" with
Trujillo that gave rise to a duty to keep her from harming third
parties that were foreseeably at risk from her, including the
Higginses. Because an understanding of the special relationship
doctrine is crucial to this discussion, we begin with a brief
xr^
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review of the concept. Section 315 of Restatement (Second) of
Torts sets out a formulation of this doctrine. It provides two
exceptions to the general rule that one has no duty to control
the conduct of third persons. Section 315 states:
There is no duty to control the conduct of a
third person so as to prevent him [or her]
from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists
between the actor and the third person
which imposes a duty upon the actor to
control the third persons conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists
between the actor and the other which
gives the other a right to protection.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1977). These exceptions are
further elaborated upon in sections 314 and 319 of the
Restatement. See Rollins. 813 P.2d 1159-60.
In Utahf we have applied the Restatements special
relationship exception to the general rule that there is no duty
to control the conduct of third persons. See Rollins. 813 P.2d
at 1159. However, unlike the Restatement writers, we do not
attempt in our duty analysis to rigorously maintain the
artificial categorization that differentiates between cases based
on whether the actor owes the duty to the victim or to the
victimizer, e.g.. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 315, 319,
nor do we apply the Restatement's precise formulation
uncritically. Instead, we have taken a policy-based approach in
determining whether a special relation should be said to exist
and consequently whether a duty is owed. Rollins. 813 P.2d at
1161; Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151-52; Beach, 726 P.2d at 415; see
Owens, 784 P.2d at 1193 (Zimmerman, J., concurring specially,
joined by Hall, C.J., and Howe, Assoc. C.J.).
Determining whether the actor has a duty to prevent
another , s harm requires careful consideration of the consequences
of imposing that duty for the parties and for society. Beach,
726 P.2d at 418. We are loath to recognize a duty that is
realistically incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds
with the nature of the parties' relationship. Id. Accordingly,
in determining the existence of a duty, we examine such factors
as the identity and character of the actor, the victim, and the
victimizer, the relationship of the actor to the victim and the
victimizer, and the practical impact that finding a special
relationship would have. See Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1160. As we
explained in Beach:
[I]t is meaningless to speak of "special
relationships" and "duties" in the abstract.
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These terms are only labels which the legal
system applies to defined situations to
indicate that certain rights and obligations
flow from them; they are "an expression of
the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that a
particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection."
Beach. 726 P.2d at 418 (quoting William Prosser, Law of Torts 333
(3d ed. 1964)).
In Beach. Ferree. and Rollins, we performed this sort
of pragmatic, policy-based analysis in the context of claims that
an injured party, as a member of a large undifferentiated group,
such as a university student body (Beach) or the general public
(Ferree and Rollins), was owed a duty by a defendant to protect
the injured party from self-created dangers (Beach) or from
injuries by third parties under the custody or control of the
defendant (Ferree and Rollins). In each, we concluded that if
the broad claim for a special relationship and the consequent
duty was accepted, the defendant in question would be unable to
perform the duty without either radically changing its character
or drastically circumscribing the function it was charged with
performing. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1161; Ferree. 784 P.2d at 151;
Beach. 726 P.2d at 419-20.
A general principle can be drawn from these cases. In
the context of a claim that an actor having custody or control of
another owed a duty to prevent harm to or by that other, our
overriding practical concern is whether the one causing the harm
has shown him- or herself to be uniquely dangerous so that the
actor upon whom the alleged duty would fall can be reasonably
expected, consistent with the practical realities of that actor's
relationship to the one in custody or under control, to
distinguish that person from others similarly situated, to
appreciate the unique threat this person presents, and to act to
minimize or protect against that threat. When such circumstances
are present, a special relationship can be said to exist and a
duty sensibly may be imposed. E.g.. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1162.
It is important to recognize that in the abovereferenced cases, we did not reject the possibility of a duty
flowing from these institutions to specific individuals or narrow
classes of individuals who for some reason were distinguishable
from the mass; we only rejected the claims for broad categories
of special relationships which operatively seem to be
indistinguishable from a general negligence theory. Id. at 115962; Ferree. 784 P.2d at 151-52; Beach. 726 P.2d at 416. As we
held in Rollins, this analysis produces results that appear to
diverge from sections 314, 315, and 319 of the Restatement. 813
P.2d at 1161-62. However, we think our approach is more
realistic than that which would result from a broad reading of
No. 900255
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the Restatement, especially when one considers the fact that at
bottom, the issue is one of negligence—a lack of reasonable
care—as opposed to what actions of others it would be nice to be
insured against.5
With this background in mind, we turn to the facts of
this case. We begin with the question of whether defendants had
a special relationship with Trujillo. Higgins argues that a
special relationship exists between every therapist and every
patient, the breach of which results in liability to anyone
injured as a consequence. Therefore, she claims, each defendant
has a special relationship with Trujillo that required committing
or voluntarily admitting her. We reject this argument. Under
the Beach/Ferree/Rollins analytical model, the fact that a
relationship between one person and another can be characterized
as "special" for some purposes does not determine whether that
relation is special for purposes of imposing a tort duty in
contravention of the general rule that one has no duty to control
another person,s actions. As we noted in Beach, the
characterization of a relationship as special is a conclusion, a
label that announces the results of a policy analysis, not a
substitute for analysis. 726 P.2d at 417-18. Higgins offers no
analysis beyond labels to support her argument.
Higgins's second special relationship theory is that
defendants owed her and her daughter a duty to control Trujillo,
5

Defendants correctly argue that many courts have
identified the actor's legal ability to control the third person
as the factor that determines the existence of a special
relationship. See, e.g., Hokansen v. United States. 868 F.2d
372, 377 (10th Cir. 1989); Abernathv. 773 F.2d at 189-90; Hasenei
v. United States. 541 F. Supp. 999, 1009 (D. Md. 1982); Cooke.
735 P.2d at 836; Perreira v. State. 768 P.2d 1198, 1215-16 (Colo.
1989); Johnson Estate v. Condell Memorial HOSP.. 520 N.E.2d 37,
41 (111. 1988). Here, defendants contend that because Trujillo
was a voluntary patient, they lacked the ability to control her
and therefore could not have a special relationship with her.
We have employed this legal-power-to-control analysis
ourselves in certain cases. See Doe v. Arcruelles. 716 P.2d 279,
282 (Utah 1985); Little v. Division of Family Servs.. 667 P.2d
49, 54-55 (Utah 1983). At the same time, however, we have moved
away from an exclusive reliance on this factor, just as we do not
rely on the Restatement's mechanistic relational models in
deciding whether a duty exists. Instead, we have concentrated on
broader public policy concerns to determine whether the
relationship gives rise to an affirmative duty to control
another. See, e.g.. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1161-62; Ferree. 784
P.2d at 151; Beach. 726 P.2d at 418. The legal ability to
control a third party may figure in this public policy analysis,
but it is only one factor to consider and is not determinative of
whether a special relationship exists.
9
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a dangerous person, because of Trujillo's special relationship to
defendants. Our decision in Rollins, which built upon Beach and
Ferree. sets the standard that governs this issue. There, in the
context of an action against the state hospital for harm caused
to a member of the public by an escaped patient, we held that
before we would impose a duty on a hospital to those harmed by a
patient, it must be shown that the custodian knew or should have
known that unless steps were taken to protect others from the
detainee, he or she was "likely" to cause bodily harm to persons
who were "reasonably identifiable by the custodian either
individually or as members of a distinct group." Rollins. 813
P.2d at 1162. We elaborated that "for a person or group to be
reasonably identifiable, the bodily harm caused will be of a type
that the custodian knew or should have known the detainee was
likely to cause if not controlled." Id. We reasoned that when
the theoretical danger of the one in custody became sufficiently
crystallized that it took on a specific object and means, it
became reasonable to impose a duty for two reasons: First, the
detainee has been distinguished from the remainder of the
population, and second, the identification of a victim and a
means has made it feasible for the custodian to take concrete
steps to prevent the harm. Id.
This same test seems suited to the instant case. Here,
the patient may be voluntary, but the other characteristics of
the parties7 relationship are substantially similar to those in
Rollins. The patient is mentally ill, presenting at least the
potential of danger to self or others; the therapist is charged
by his or her professional role to provide care for the patient
in a confidential provider/patient relationship with a view
toward recovery and return to normal life; and the therapist is
legally restricted in using confinement to those situations in
which the patient presents an identifiable danger to self or
others and then must use the minimum level of confinement
necessary. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-12-222, -234(10)(d), 235(2), -241; O'Connor v. Donaldson. 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
Limiting the duty to third parties who are "reasonably
identifiable by the [therapist] either individually or as [a]
member[] of a distinct group," Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1162, permits
us, in most instances, to uphold the public policies of
protecting the traditional confidentiality of the
provider/patient relationship, which is important both for
privacy reasons and for the efficacy of the therapeutic
relationship. At the same time, it ensures the minimum use of
involuntary commitment consistent with protecting identifiable
potential victims. See Schopp & Wexler at 183; Robert F. Schopp
& Michael R. Quattrocchi, Tarasoff.
the Doctrine of Special
Relationships and the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn. J.
Psychiatry & L. 13, 23 (Spring 1984) [hereinafter Schopp &
Quattrocchi]; Fleming & Maximov at 1032; Beigler at 277; Mills at
250-51.
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Moreover, by adopting this standard for voluntary and
involuntary health-care provider/patient relationships, we limit
the duty to take steps to protect others by imposing a high level
of confinement upon the patient to situations in which it is
arguably possible for the therapist to distinguish between those
who do present a real danger and those who do not. Any broader
duty would be realistically incapable of performance. This
consideration is important and, to a degree, implicitly underlies
our decisions in Ferree and Rollins. The empirical evidence that
has come to our attention is almost unanimous that dangerousness
cannot be predicted with any degree of success. See, e.g.,
Schopp & Quattrocchi at 23. "Not only have psychologists and
psychiatrists been unable to predict dangerousness to a degree of
accuracy which would justify infringing on a client's rights,
they have been unable to predict any more accurately than have
nonprofessionals." Id.: Robert M. Wettstein, The Prediction of
Violent Behavior and the Duty to Protect Third Parties, 2 Behav.
Sciences & L. 291 (1984); accord Beigler at 280-82. For this
reason, we limit the imposition of a duty to protect to those
situations identified in Rollins in which there is an overt
indication that the one in custody or under treatment is
distinguishable from the mass of those in custody or under
treatment, all of whom might be said in general terms to be
dangerous to someone. See Schopp & Wexler at 173.6
Applying this standard to the facts before us, we find
that Trujillo never actually distinguished herself from the other
potentially dangerous patients t^y threatening an identifiable
victim., Trujillo's stabbing of an elderly woman three years
TSef ore her attack on Shaundra did not make Shaundra an
identifiable victim or even a member of a distinct, identifiable
class. As far as the record reveals, Shaundra and the elderly
woman had nothing in common but gender. The entire
undifferentiated female half of the population does not comprise
a distinct, identifiable group.
However, this conclusion does not end the matter.
While Trujillo may not have identified Shaundra as a potential
victim, Higgins contends that if defendants had performed their
professional responsibilities properly, Trujillo would have
revealed Shaundra as a potential target. Higgins argues that
Trujillo did not reveal her obsession with Shaundra because of
6

Although we reach this holding solely on common law
grounds, we note that this result is consistent with legislation
enacted five years after Shaundra was stabbed. That statute
provides, "A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to
provide protection from any violent behavior of his [or her]
client or patient, except when that client or patient
communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical
violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable
victim." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) (emphasis added).
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defendants' negligent treatment and therefore that negligence
should not excuse defendants from a duty that would have arisen
had they acted in accordance with the appropriate standard of
care. Otherwise, they say, care providers would have an
incentive to avoid diagnostically appropriate examinations that
could reveal specific threats and give rise to a special
relationship and the consequent duty to the potential victim.
As stated in Rollins, we will find a special
relationship and consequent duty when a defendant knew of the
likely danger to an individual or distinct group of individuals
or when a defendant should have known of such danger.7 813 P.2d
at 1162. In the context of the present case, if the steps taken
by defendants were not reasonable in light of Trujillo/s symptoms
and if reasonable action would have revealed that Trujillo was
likely to inflict grievous bodily harm on Shaundra, then a
special relationship would arise. Higgins/s factual allegation
that proper examination and diagnosis would have disclosed that
Trujillo was brooding over Shaundra and had targeted her for an
attack presents a sufficient claim that a duty existed.
Consequently, the trial court should not have granted summary
judgment for defendants on the duty issue.
Having concluded that the trial court erred in basing
its summary judgment on the lack of duty, we must next address a
question not reached by the trial court: Are defendants immune
from suit under the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act
("the Act11)?
In structure, the Act grants immunity to all persons
performing governmental functions but then withdraws that
immunity for certain persons under certain circumstances and
£grfa*4*L^Y^p+-J^g- nfc*tv (win Amr 5 f n m i . fffnth plninfiff'T
and defendants agree that UMC and SLCMH were performing*governmental functions within the meaning of the Act^j Therefore,
they are immune from suit unless the Act waives that immunity and/
£ioes not provide an applicable exception to that waivejr. JV^T
The Act waives immunity for an "injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury . . .
(b) arises out of assault, battery . . . ." Id. § 63-30-10(1)(b)
(1986) (now codified at § 63-30-10(2)) (emphasis added).
Defendants contend that the Act bars Higgins's claim because
7

We emphasize here that the phrase "should have known"
should not be construed to require that a health-care provider
take measures not otherwise indicated by the apparent symptoms of
the patient. As we noted earlier, we decline to impose any
additional duty on the health-care provider that would distort
the traditional relationship between the provider and patient and
the provider's duty to that patient.
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Shaundra's injuries and Higgins's mental distress arose out of
Trujillo,s assault and battery. Higgins responds that section
63-30-10 does not preserve immunity for injuries arising from an
assault or battery if the assailant is not a governmental
employee.
Under the logic of Ledfors v. Emery County School
District, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 19, 1993), we find
Biggins's argument to be without merit. First, by its plain
language, section 63-30-10 preserves immunity for negligence that
results in an "injury . . . [that] arises out of [an] assault,
[or] battery . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(b) (1986)
(now codified at § 63-30-10(2)). The statute simply does not
contain the distinction on which Higgins stakes her claim. In
fact, its language suggests that the legislature contemplated no
such distinction. The section in question provides that the
negligence of a governmental employee is not actionable when, as
a result of that negligence, an assault or battery is committed
by another. Nothing suggests that the one committing the assault
or battery need be a government employee, and the entire focus of
the subsection is upon the negligent government employee, not on
the intentionally acting assailant. Because it is the negligence
of the governmental employee upon which any claim of liability
must rest, it would make no sense to engraft upon that waiver a
limitation based upon the status of the assailant.
We also note that Higgins cites no Utah authority for
her position. Nor could she. When we have considered claims
that the state's negligence permitted an assault by a person who
was not a state employee, we have held uniformly that the state
is immune. See, e.g., Ledfors, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5-6;
Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Utah
1987); Madsen v. State. 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978); Eotina v.
State, 546 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 1976); Emerv v. State, 26 Utah 2d
1, 2, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1971); Sheffield v. Turner. 21 Utah 2d
314, 316-17, 445 P.2d 367, 368-69 (Utah 1969); see also Kirk v.
State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, we follow Ledfors and hold that section
63-30-10 bars a suit against a governmental entity for injuries
alleged to have been caused by negligence that results in an
assault or battery, whether or not the assailant is a government
employee. Here, the injuries alleged to flow from the negligence
of the governmental defendants all stem from a battery—
Trujillo/s stabbing of Shaundra. Consequently, section 63-30-10
bars this action. Therefore, although we hold that the trial
court erred in basing a grant of summary judgment on the lack of
duty, governmental immunity presents an independent ground for
affirming the decision below. See Hill, 827 P.2d at 246.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hallf Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, concurs in the result.
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